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CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE




In 2004, the United States Supreme Court drastically shifted the
course of jurisprudence relating to the nexus between the Sixth Amend-
ment right to confrontation and the widespread use of hearsay exceptions
in criminal trials.2 Based on a historical examination of the purpose and
underlying intent of the Confrontation Clause, the Court, in Crawford v.
Washington, concluded that the resolution of the question of admissibility
pursuant to a firmly-rooted hearsay exception is no longer a sufficient
proxy for the exacting scrutiny required by the Sixth Amendment.
The use of certain hearsay exceptions has been especially helpful in
the prosecution of child abuse. Many times, child-abuse cases present sig-
nificant challenges for prosecutors who, given the nature of the case, are
often faced with a traumatized child witness and very little physical evi-
dence. These unique challenges were recognized by the Supreme Court in
1987 when it stated that "[c]hild abuse is one of the most difficult crimes to
detect and prosecute, in large part because there often are no witnesses
except the victim."4 However, it is unclear whether the unique challenges
associated with the prosecution of child abuse and the state interest in pro-
tecting child witnesses from extreme emotional distress will be sufficient to
overcome the strict demands of post-Crawford analysis. As such, the fol-
lowing discussion will examine the Crawford decision and address the po-
tential implications for the presentation of child-witness testimony in
Mississippi.'
1. Professor Lisa S. Nored is Interim Chair of the Department of Administration of Justice and
Director of the Statistical Analysis Center at the University of Southern Mississippi. She holds under-
graduate and graduate degrees in criminal justice and a J.D. from Mississippi College School of Law.
Professor Nored received specialized training in child welfare at the University of Michigan School of
Law and served as law clerk to Mississippi Supreme Court Justice James W. Smith Jr. She is currently
completing a Ph.D. in Public Administration at Mississippi State University. She is a member of the
Southern Juvenile Defender Center Advisory Board at the Southern Poverty Law Center.
2. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
3. Id.
4. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987).
5. See also LISA S. NORED, CHILD ADVOCACY IN MISSISSIPPI (2005).
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II. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND THE CHILD WITNESS
A. Pre-Crawford Jurisprudence
While the Crawford decision has significant implications for the pres-
entation of statements made by child witnesses, it is important to appreci-
ate the evolution of jurisprudence before undertaking a thorough review of
Crawford v. Washington. Pre-Crawford decisions by the United States Su-
preme Court reflect a judicial body that is protective of the fundamental
right of criminal defendants to confront their accusers at trial yet also cog-
nizant of the unique needs of child witnesses. The Court labored to find an
appropriate balance to accommodate each interest. The post-Crawford ap-
proach, however, appears to be much more exacting and considerably less
accommodating of alternatives to in-court testimony in criminal trials.
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution clearly provides criminal
defendants with the right to confront adverse witnesses in a criminal trial.6
In Coy v. Iowa, Justice Scalia specifically stated that "[w]e have never
doubted, therefore, that the Confrontation Clause guarantees the defen-
dant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of
fact."7 However, while the statement penned by Justice Scalia reflects the
traditional view, throughout the nineties the Court was called upon to re-
solve the constitutional issues implicated by the increasing use among the
states of procedural alternatives to present testimony.
Many alternatives were specifically designed to alleviate the trauma of
child-abuse victims who were required to testify against their abusers in
court.' For example, in Coy the Court was faced with a Sixth Amendment
challenge to the use of a barrier in a criminal trial.9 Iowa law allowed the
shield to be used in cases where it was necessary to shield the victim from
the perpetrator at trial."°
In a sense, the Coy decision opened the door for procedural modifica-
tions in criminal trials. The Court exhibited a willingness to accommodate
the needs of child witnesses and acknowledged that the Confrontation
Clause was not absolute in its guarantee of a face-to-face encounter be-
tween victims and the accused." It concluded that exceptions to the Con-
frontation Clause may exist if necessary to promote an important public
policy.' 2 While the Court did not specifically delineate what exceptions
were permissible, the concurring opinion by Justice O'Connor proved in-
formative. Justice O'Connor concurred with the majority's view that the
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
7. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988).
8. See Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 531 A.2d 459, 463 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987), rev'd, 594 A.2d 281
(Pa. 1991), where the Pennsylvania Superior Court stated that "[tihe right to confront does not confer
upon an accused the right to intimidate."
9. Coy, 487 U.S. 1012.
10. Id. at 1014-15 (citing IOWA CODE § 910A.14 (1987) (repealed 1998)).
11. Id. at 1020-21.
12. Id. at 1021.
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Sixth Amendment did not require a face-to-face encounter in all situa-
tions.'3 Moreover, Justice O'Connor clearly reflected an appreciation of
the unique issues that attend the prosecution of child abuse and concluded
that nothing in the majority opinion "necessarily dooms such efforts by
state legislatures to protect child witnesses."14 Unlike the majority, Justice
O'Connor was willing to specifically acknowledge the interest of states in
the protection of child witnesses as an important public policy which may,
in turn, justify exceptions to the Confrontation Clause.15
Two years later, in Maryland v. Craig,1 6 the Court was again required
to resolve a conflict between the Sixth Amendment and a procedural alter-
native. Craig involved a challenge to a Maryland statute that allowed the
use of one-way closed-circuit television in child-abuse cases. 17 Justice
O'Connor, now writing for the majority, stated that the "central concern of
the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against
a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an
adversary proceeding before the trier of fact."' 8 Thus, while face-to-face
confrontation is preferred, the Court concluded that the Confrontation
Clause was not absolute in its guarantee of a face-to-face encounter.1 9 The
Court observed that a strict interpretation of the Sixth Amendment, requir-
ing face-to-face encounters in all situations, would effectively eliminate the
use of all hearsay exceptions.2 ° It held that the Sixth Amendment "'must
occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities
of the case.'"21
In Craig, the Court concluded that the state interest in the protection
of child-abuse victims from the trauma of testifying in criminal trials is a
compelling interest that is sufficient to justify the use of a procedural alter-
native.22 However, the Court did not allow the wholesale use of procedu-
ral modifications in all prosecutions involving child victims who must
testify.23 Rather, Craig requires a trial court to conduct a hearing to evalu-
ate whether the procedure is necessary to protect the child.24 Thus, in or-
der to utilize a procedural alternative, the state must establish the
following:
* the procedure is required to protect the child's welfare;
13. Id. at 1022 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 1023.
15. Id. at 1025.
16. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 845.
19. Id. at 844.
20. Id. at 848.
21. Id. at 849 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895)).
22. Id. at 852 (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk County, 457 U.S. 596
(1982); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)).
23. Id. at 856.
24. Id. at 857-58.
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" the child would suffer emotional distress due to the presence of the
defendant;25 and
• if required to testify, the emotional distress is more than de
minimis.26
In evaluating claims of emotional distress, the Court held that the trauma
must be "more than mere nervousness or excitement or some reluctance to
testify.
27
States also utilize videotaped testimony of child witnesses in criminal
trials in an effort to reduce their trauma and enhance their ability to testify.
The use of videotaped testimony, like closed-circuit television, arguably
raises Sixth Amendment issues. However, the Supreme Court has not yet
addressed the use of videotaped testimony. Most state appellate courts
that have considered the issue have utilized guidelines similar to those es-
tablished in Maryland v. Craig.
The use of hearsay exceptions to introduce statements of child wit-
nesses in child-abuse cases, a useful alternative for prosecutors, was ad-
dressed by the Supreme Court in Idaho v. Wright 8 and White v. Illinois.29
In Wright, the trial court admitted out-of-court statements made by a three-
year-old victim of sexual abuse.3 ° Statements by the child to an examining
physician were admitted pursuant to a residual hearsay exception.31 The
defendant challenged the admission of the statements, arguing that it vio-
lated the Sixth Amendment.32
In its analysis, the Court held that admissibility pursuant to a hearsay
exception did not provide insulation from Sixth Amendment scrutiny.33
Trial courts must insure that incriminating statements satisfy the require-
ments of the Sixth Amendment as well as the hearsay exception. 34 The
Court utilized the test established in Ohio v. Roberts35 to determine
whether the statements were admissible.36
The Roberts test requires that the proponent of the statement must
establish that the declarant is unavailable and that the statement possesses
25. If the source of the trauma to the child is the courtroom environment, as opposed to the
presence of the defendant, the child may be allowed to testify in less intimidating surroundings with the
defendant present. In such situations, there is no denial of the right to confrontation. Id. at 856.
26. Id.
27. Id. (quoting Wildermuth v. State, 530 A.2d 275, 289 (Md. 1987)).
28. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
29. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
30. Wright, 497 U.S. at 809-12.
31. The exception allows the admission of statements not covered by any other exception that
are offered "(A) ... as evidence of a material fact; (B) ... [are] more probative on the point for which
[they are] offered than any other evidence . . .procur[able] through reasonable efforts; and (C) the
introduction of such evidence serves the purpose of the rules of evidence and the interests of justice."
Id. at 812 (quoting IDAHO R. EVID. 803(24)).
32. Wright, 497 U.S. at 812.
33. Id. at 814-15.
34. See id.
35. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
36. Wright, 497 U.S at 814-15.
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sufficient indicia of reliability.37 However, in Roberts, the Court held that
reliability may be inferred if the statement falls within a "firmly rooted"
hearsay exception.38 If the exception is not considered to be "firmly
rooted," the proponent must establish that the statement possesses "partic-
ularized guarantees of trustworthiness."39
In Wright, the Court concluded that residual hearsay exceptions were
not firmly rooted and, therefore, statements admitted pursuant to that ex-
ception violated the Sixth Amendment absent proof that they possessed
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Further, "'particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness' must be shown from the totality of the cir-
cumstances ... [which] include only those that surround the making of the
statement and that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief.""a
Moreover, the Court specifically held that trustworthiness could not be es-
tablished by simple reference to corroborating evidence." Because inde-
pendent indicia of trustworthiness were not established, the case was
reversed.42
Two years later, the Court again addressed the admission of incrimi-
nating statements of a child-abuse victim pursuant to hearsay exceptions.
In White v. Illinois,43 the defendant was convicted of aggravated sexual as-
sault of a four-year-old child. Due to trauma associated with the attack,
the child was unable to testify at trial.44 The state sought admission of
statements made by the child to her babysitter, her mother, and a police
officer immediately after the assault. Those statements were admitted pur-
suant to the spontaneous declaration exception. 5 Statements by the child
approximately four hours later to a nurse and an emergency room physi-
cian were admitted pursuant to the exceptions for spontaneous declara-
tions and for statements for purposes of medical treatment and diagnosis. n6
The defendant challenged the admission of the statements arguing that
Ohio v. Roberts47 required the state to either produce the witness at trial or
find that the witness is unavailable prior to the admission of any out-of-
37. Id. at 815-16.
38. Id. at 816 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66). Firmly rooted hearsay exceptions are unique
"because of the weight accorded longstanding judicial and legislative experience in assessing the trust-
worthiness of certain types of out-of-court statements." Wright, 497 U.S. at 817 (citations omitted).
39. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
40. Wright, 497 U.S. at 819. In conducting the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, the Court
suggested the following factors: spontaneity and consistency of the statement; the mental state of the
declarant; the use of terminology not expected from a child of that age; and lack of a motive to fabri-
cate. The Court specifically acknowledged that a disqualification of the child as a witness at trial based
on competency does not in and of itself establish that out-of-court statements by the child are unrelia-
ble. Id. at 822-23.
41. Id. at 821.
42. Id. at 827.
43. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
44. Id. at 350.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 350-51.
47. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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court statements.48 The Court rejected the argument raised by the appel-
lant and concluded that "Roberts stands for the proposition that unavaila-
bility analysis is a necessary part of the Confrontation Clause inquiry only
when the challenged out-of-court statements were made in the course of a
prior judicial proceeding."49 The Court specifically addressed its refusal to
extend the Roberts unavailability requirement to all out-of-court state-
ments.5 ° First, the Court emphasized the need to present the statements
within the context in which they were made. It acknowledged that declar-
ants inherently have difficultly replicating certain statements; therefore,
those to whom the statements were made may offer evidence regarding the
context of the statement 51 The Court also found that the evidentiary bene-
fits achieved by the imposition of the unavailability requirement could, in
many cases, be outweighed by the burden upon the state if prosecutors
were required to continually locate and subpoena each declarant to trial.
52
Lastly, the Court held that an unavailability requirement was unnecessary
when hearsay exceptions are considered to be "firmly rooted." The Court
concluded that such exceptions provide for the admission of statements
made in "contexts which provide substantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness." 53 Thus, in White the Court essentially concluded that admissibility
pursuant to a firmly rooted hearsay exception satisfied the Confrontation
Clause.54
B. Crawford v. Washington
While the Court had become more flexible in its approach to the im-
pact of the Confrontation Clause on statements admitted pursuant to hear-
say exceptions, the tide was about to turn. In Crawford, the Supreme
Court seized the opportunity to revert to a more exacting treatment of the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and thus restore the true
protections contemplated for criminal defendants.55
In Crawford, the defendant was charged with attempted murder and
assault.56 Crawford alleged at trial that the victim had attempted to rape
his wife and therefore raised a claim of self-defense. At trial, Crawford's
wife did not testify due to the marital privilege and the prosecution sought
admission of her audiotaped statement to the police wherein she described
the stabbing. Relying on the analysis in Ohio v. Roberts, the trial court
admitted the statement based on its indicia of trustworthiness.
57
48. White, 502 U.S. at 353.
49. Id. at 354.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 355.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 356.
55. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
56. Id. at 40.
57. Id.
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On appeal, the Court reversed the decision of the Washington Su-
preme Court and overturned the conviction.58 The focus of the opinion
was the continued sufficiency of the "reliability" analysis as announced in
Ohio v. Roberts. After a thorough review of the historical basis for the
Confrontation Clause, the Court concluded that the Roberts test was insuf-
ficient for purposes of the Sixth Amendment. In overruling Roberts, the
Court stated that "the Roberts test allows a jury to hear evidence, untested
by the adversary process, based on a mere judicial determination of relia-
bility."59 The Court specifically held that the Confrontation Clause "com-
mands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a
particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. 60
In order to admit out-of-court statements that are "testimonial" in na-
ture at trial, even those that fall within firmly rooted hearsay exceptions,
the proponent must establish that the declarant is unavailable and was sub-
jected to cross-examination at the time the statement was made.61 The
Court concluded that such an approach was consistent with the historical
purpose of the Confrontation Clause, which sought to avoid admission of
testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he
was unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity for
cross examination. However, in cases where the proffered statement is
non-testimonial, the Crawford Court concluded that it is "wholly consistent
with the Framers' design to afford the States flexibility in their develop-
ment of hearsay law-as does Roberts, and as would an approach that ex-
empted such statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether.
'6
C. The Implications of Crawford
Commentators predict that the Crawford decision will have the most
significant impact on domestic-violence and child-abuse prosecutions.
63
The dynamics of spousal and child abuse often pose unique challenges for
the legal system. Over the last decade modern courts, armed with a more
enlightened understanding of domestic violence and child maltreatment,
have been more empathetic to the issues attending prosecution of these
cases. However, Crawford, unlike Coy v. Iowa, Maryland v. Craig, and
White v. Illinois, evidences little tolerance for the public-policy implications
58. Id. at 69.
59. Id. at 62.
60. Id. at 61.
61. Id. at 68.
62. Id.
63. See Erin Thompson, Child Sex Abuse Victims: How Will Their Stories Be Heard After Craw-
ford v. Washington?, 27 CAMPBELL L. REV. 279 (2005); David Jaros, The Lessons of People v. Moscat:
Confronting Judicial Bias in Domestic Violence Cases Interpreting Crawford v. Washington, 42 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 995 (2005); Heather L. McKimmie, Repercussions of Crawford v. Washington: A Child's
Statement to a Washington State Child Protective Services Worker May be Inadmissible, 80 WASH. L.
REV. 219 (2005); Whitney Baugh, Why the Sky Didn't Fall: Using Judicial Creativity to Circumvent
Crawford v. Washington, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1835 (2005); cf. Kristen Sluyter, Sixth Amendment and
the Confrontation Clause-Testimonial Trumps Reliable: The United States Supreme Court Reconsiders
Its Approach to the Confrontation Clause, 27 U. ARK. LIrLE ROCK L. REV. 323 (2005) (discussing the
effect of Crawford v. Washington on evidentiary procedures in the criminal justice system).
2005]
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of its mandate. As such, Crawford has the potential to significantly impact
the manner in which prosecutions in these cases are handled. One only
hopes that it is not a deterrent.
The exact implications are not yet known and will be apparent only as
lower courts work to interpret and apply the Crawford decision. A key
element that will be determinative of the impact of Crawford on child-
abuse prosecutions is the manner in which "testimonial" is interpreted.
While the Crawford Court declined to specifically delineate which state-
ments were testimonial in nature, it did offer some guidance for lower
courts. It suggested that testimonial statements are "'extrajudicial state-
ments . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials."' 64 Plea allocu-
tions; testimony offered at preliminary hearings, depositions, grand jury
proceedings, or prior trials; statements contained in affidavits; confessions
to police; and responses to police interrogation would be properly charac-
terized as testimonial.65 Moreover, the Court noted that statements made
to law enforcement officers would be testimonial if made "under circum-
stances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that
the statement would be available for use at a later trial."
66
Thus, while the Court provided some guidance, a great deal of ambigu-
ity surrounds the future application of the Crawford rule. Lower courts
have begun the process of post-Crawford hearsay analysis and cases are
beginning to emerge from review by appellate courts. The Mississippi Su-
preme Court recently addressed the Crawford rule as it applied to the ad-
mission of statements made by a five-year-old child pursuant to the medical
treatment and diagnosis exception67 and the tender years exception.68
Scott Foley was convicted of capital rape, sexual battery, and child ex-
ploitation.69 The child was deemed unavailable to testify at trial due to her
age and developmental ability.v On appeal, Foley challenged the admis-
sion of statements by his five-year-old daughter to Dr. Ruth Cash, a thera-
pist who interviewed the child.71 The appellate challenge by Foley was dual
in nature and focused on the requirements of the Mississippi Rules of Evi-
dence as well as his inability to cross-examine the child as required by
Crawford v. Washington.72
Following review, the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded that the
admission of statements pursuant to the above-referenced hearsay excep-
tions was proper.73 In Foley, the court held that Crawford addresses only
those statements that are testimonial in nature. 4 As a preliminary matter,
64. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992)).
65. Id.
66. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
67. Miss. R. EVID. 803(4).
68. Miss. R. EVID. 803(25); Foley v. State, 914 So. 2d 677 (Miss. 2005).
69. Foley, 914 So. 2d at 682.
70. Id. at 683.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 683-85.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 685.
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Foley was required to establish that the challenged statements were testi-
monial. Relying on Crawford, the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded
that the statements by the child to her therapist were not testimonial in
nature. 76 The court noted that Foley "failed to argue or show that the ther-
apists or medical professionals who testified concerning statements made
by K.F. had contacted the police or were being used by the police as a
means to interrogate K.F. or investigate her claims."77 The court con-
cluded that the statements by the child "were made as a part of neutral
medical evaluations and thus do not meet Crawford's 'testimonial'
criterion."7 "
The approach taken by the Mississippi Supreme Court in Foley is simi-
lar to that used in other states. In State v. Forrest,79 the defendant chal-
lenged the admission of statements pursuant to the excited utterance
exception. The challenged statements were made by the victim to law en-
forcement officers immediately following rescue from her kidnapper.8"
The victim was unavailable and did not testify at trial.81 As a result, the
prosecution sought admission of the statements made to the officer.82 Fol-
lowing review by the North Carolina Court of Appeals, the admission of
the statements at trial under the excited utterance exception was
affirmed.83
Again, the resolution of the Sixth Amendment challenge focused on
the nature of the statements.84 Like the Foley court, this court concluded
that they were not testimonial.8 5 "Just as with a 911 call, a spontaneous
statement made to police immediately after a rescue can be considered
'part of the criminal incident itself, rather than as a part of the prosecution
that follows.' "86
In other cases, however, the results have been markedly different. For
example, in State v. Snowden,s7 the Maryland Court of Appeals reviewed
the admission of statements made to a social worker by child victims of
sexual abuse pursuant to the tender years exception. Following review, the
court concluded that the admission of the statements at trial violated the
Confrontation Clause and the holding of Crawford v. Washington.88 The





79. State v. Forrest, 596 S.E.2d 22 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
80. Id. at 27.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 29.
84. Id. at 26.
85. Id. at 27.
86. Id. (quoting People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S. 2d 875, 880 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 2004)).
87. State v. Snowden, 867 A.2d 314 (Md. 2005).
88. Id. at 325-30.
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in every way the functional equivalent of the formal police questioning dis-
cussed in Crawford as a prime example of what may be considered
testimonial."89
In reaching its decision, the court relied on the following circum-
stances. First, the court noted that the social worker was asked by law en-
forcement to interview the children.9" The court distinguished the case
from other cases where the interviews were conducted "because they were
in the course of ascertaining whether a crime had been committed."91 In
Snowden, however, the "children's statements were elicited by [the social
worker] subsequent to initial questioning of them by police and after the
identity of a suspect was known. '92 The court deemed the social worker
"for Confrontation Clause analysis, [to be] an agent of the police
department."93
In addition, the children indicated during the interview that they were
aware of the potential for their statements to be used as evidence at a
trial.94 The court noted that one purpose of the interviews was to satisfy
the requirements of the tender years exception.95 It was not receptive to
the argument by the state that the fact that the interviews were conducted
by a social worker, as opposed to a member of law enforcement, rendered
the statement nontestimonial.96 The court held that the role of the social
worker in this particular case "was little different from the role of a police
officer in a routine police interrogation." 97 Therefore, the court concluded
that the "structure, location, and style of the interviews actually support the
notion that the children's interviews were a formal and structured interro-
gation where the responses reasonably would be expected to be used at a
later trial."98
In People v. Sisavath,9 9 the defendant, convicted of multiple counts of
child sexual abuse and narcotics violations, challenged the admission of
statements made by the four-year-old victim to a law enforcement officer
and to child-abuse investigators. The child was not deemed competent to
testify at trial due to her inability to respond to questions and understand
the duty to tell the truth."° As such, she was unavailable to testify.1"1
On appeal, the state conceded that statements by the child to the po-
lice officer were clearly testimonial in light of Crawford v. Washington.
10 2




93. Id. at 327. The court specifically noted that the social worker had extensive training in the
investigation and interviewing of child witnesses and in testifying about the results of her investigations.




98. Id. (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004)).
99. People v. Sisavath, 118 Cal. App. 4th 1396 (2004).
100. Id. at 1400.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1402.
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Following review, the court concluded that statements by the child to child-
abuse investigators were likewise testimonial." 3 In support of its conclu-
sion, the court relied on the fact that the interviews were conducted after
the initial complaint and information had been filed and the preliminary
hearing held.104 Moreover, a deputy district attorney and an investigator
were present during the interview by a forensic interview specialist. 105 The
court was not persuaded by the state's argument that the statements were
not testimonial in nature due to the neutral location of the interview; that
the interviewer was not a government employee; or that the interview may
not have been conducted solely for a prosecutorial purpose, but also for
therapeutic purposes or in preparation for removal proceedings.
10 6
In People v. Harless,°7 the California Court of Appeals for the Sixth
District concluded that statements by children to a pediatrician and a child
abuse interview specialist were testimonial in nature because they were
made "in the course of the district attorney's investigation of child abuse
allegations against [the] defendant."'01 8 However, the defendant argued
that although the victim did appear at trial, she was unavailable for cross
examination because she testified inconsistently at trial, was unable to re-
call her prior statements, and so could not be thoroughly cross-examined
about such matters.'0 9 Harless argued, therefore, that the admission of
prior inconsistent statements violated the Confrontation Clause and Craw-
ford v. Washington. In rejecting the argument of the defendant, the court
stated "that, when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the
Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior
testimonial statements.' 10 Further, the court held that "the Confrontation
Clause guarantees only an opportunity for cross-examination, not cross-
examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the
defense might wish . . .,,"
In Lawson v. State,"a2 the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the
admission of a social worker's testimony recounting out-of-court state-
ments made by the child-victim and admitted pursuant to the tender years
103. Id. at 1402-03.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1402.
107. People v. Harless, 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). Review was granted by the
California Supreme Court and this opinion was depublished. People v. Harless, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 568
(Cal. 2005). Review was then dismissed in light of the decision reached in People v. Black, 29 Cal. Rptr.
3d 740 (Cal. 2005), which was decided on grounds different from those presented in this paper. People
v. Harless, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 198 (Cal. 2005).
108. Id. at 636.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 637 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004)).
111. Id. (quoting United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559 (1988) (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer,
482 U.S. 730 (1987))).
112. Lawson v. State, 886 A.2d 876 (Md. 2005). The appellate court reversed the convictions and
remanded the case for a new trial based on improper comments made by the prosecutor during closing
arguments. See id. at 898.
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exception.113 The court distinguished Lawson from its prior decision in
State v. Snowden" 4 due to the critical fact that the victim testified in Law-
son, which, in turn, provided the defendant with the opportunity to cross-
examine the child. 15 Unlike in Snowden, the "social worker did not testify
in the place of the children.""' 6 The cou:t, however, did not conduct an
analysis to determine whether the statements were testimonial.
III. CONCLUSION
In most child-abuse cases, there is no physical evidence. Statements
by victims are often the primary source of evidence in these cases. How-
ever, because of their vulnerability, youth, and the extent of their trauma,
presentation of testimony by children can be inherently difficult. As a re-
sult, the widespread use of procedural modifications and hearsay excep-
tions to facilitate the introduction and admission of statements by child
witnesses has evolved over the last two decades in an effort to facilitate
prosecution of these cases.
On its face, Crawford v. Washington"7 strikes a healthy blow at the
use of hearsay exceptions to admit prior statements by child complainants.
During its short lifespan, Crawford has resulted in the reversal of numerous
convictions throughout the country. A central theme emerging from the
review of decisions reversing convictions in child-abuse cases post-Craw-
ford is the importance of the analysis wherein appellate courts determine
whether a statement is "testimonial" in nature. Statements have been con-
sidered testimonial where therapists or social workers work in conjunction
with or as agents of law enforcement; where law enforcement or agents of
the district attorney are present during interviews; where interviews are
conducted after charges are filed; and where statements are obtained in
preparation for trial. Such decisions clearly reflect an unwillingness to ac-
commodate the reality of child-abuse investigations and thus an abandon-
ment of the progress made over the last two decades. In the post-Crawford
world, the burden on law enforcement and child-protection agencies in
these cases has been significantly heightened; these professionals, there-
fore, will have to become increasingly creative when conducting investiga-
tions. Particularly troubling is the fact that the increased burden in these
cases comes at a time when the extent of sex offenses against children and
the relentless pursuit of child victims by sex offenders is increasing at a
staggering rate.
113. Id. at 887.
114. See supra notes 87-98 and accompanying text.
115. Lawson, 886 A.2d at 886-87.
116. Id. at 887.
117. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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